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In the late 1960s, the American public grew in-
creasingly wary of the unchecked power of the fed-
eral government and demanded the opportunity to
monitor the actions of its officials. Responding to this
demand, Congress enacted the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act ("FOIA"),1 which set forth "a policy of
broad disclosure of Government documents in order
to ensure 'an informed citizenry, vital to the func-
tioning of a democratic society.' "'
Congress understood, however, that "legitimate
governmental and private interests could be harmed
by release of certain types of information." There-
fore, nine categorical exemptions were enacted to
prevent such harm.' The exemptions enacted func-
tion in two ways: they afford the government flexi-
bility to operate more efficiently and they preserve
the secrecy interests of information submitters.5
Under Exemption 4 of the FOIA, "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a
person [that is] privileged or confidential," is af-
forded protection from public disclosure.' The pur-
pose of this exemption is to "protect [the] interests of
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
' Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 872
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993)
(citing FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982)).
1 Id. The possible harm that could result from disclosure of
certain information is explained in the following Senate commit-
tee report: "This exception is necessary to protect the confidenti-
ality of information which is obtained by the government
through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would cus-
tomarily not be released to the public by the person from whom
it was obtained." S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1964). Also, the court in Critical Mass II pointed out that there
are circumstances where disclosure could affect the "reliability"
of data and also the "quality." Critical Mass II, 975 F.2d at
878.
4 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988). The nine categorical exemp-
tions, often called the b(4) exemptions, refer to information that
falls under the general headings of (1) National Security, (2)
Internal Agency Rules, (3) "Catch-All" Exemption, (4) Trade
Secrets, (5) Internal Agency Memoranda, (6) Personal Privacy,
(7) Law Enforcement Records, (8) Bank Reports, and (9) Oil
and Gas Well Data. Id.
' National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498
both the Government and the individual."7
In a recent en banc decision, Critical Mass En-
ergy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
("Critical Mass IT'),' the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recon-
sidered its longstanding interpretation of Exemption
4. Previously, in the 1974 National Parks & Conser-
vation Association v. Morton9 decision, the D.C.
Circuit Court applied a two-prong test to determine
whether commercial or financial business informa-
tion met the confidentiality standard under Exemp-
tion 4. In National Parks, the court declared that the
term "confidential" should be read to protect govern-
mental interests as well as private interests, accord-
ing to the following test:
[C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential" for the
purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the information
is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to im-
pair the Government's ability to obtain necessary informa-
tion in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person from whom the infor-
mation was obtained.10
F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974). S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1964), sets forth both of these legislative goals:
At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom of
information" is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect
certain equally important rights of privacy with respect to
certain information in Government files, such as medical
and personnel records. It is also necessary for the very op-
eration of our Government to allow it to keep confidential
certain material such as the investigatory files of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation.
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988).
7 498 F.2d at 767. However, the court has interpreted the
definition of "government interest" protected by Exemption 4:
"[t]his exemption is intended to encourage individuals to provide
certain kinds of confidential information to the Government, and
it must be read narrowly in accordance with that purpose."
(Emphasis added). Id. at 768 (citing Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067, 1078 (1971)).
6 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871,
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
' National Parks, 498 F.2d 765.
10 Id. at 770.
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Although the Critical Mass II court reaffirmed the
National Parks test, it also expanded the applicabil-
ity of the second prong of Exemption 4.11 In Critical
Mass II, the D.C. Circuit held that the National
Parks test applied to "required" submissions of in-
formation and established an entirely new standard
for determining the confidentiality of "voluntarily"
submitted information." "Voluntary" submissions
are protected if they are not "customarily" made
available to the public by the business submitter.
Under the new standard enunciated in Critical Mass
II, the court held that the voluntarily submitted
records, concerning safety related events occurring at
nuclear facilities, fell under Exemption 4
protection.1 3
Following the Critical Mass II decision, the Presi-
dent of the United States and the Attorney General
issued a joint FOIA policy memoranda to all federal
departments and agencies. 4 The Attorney General's
memorandum stated:
In short, it shall be the policy of the Department of Jus-
tice to defend the assertion of a FOIA exemption only in
those cases where the agency reasonably foresees that dis-
closure would be harmful to an interest protected by that
exemption. Where an item of information might techni-
cally or arguably fall within an exemption, it ought not to
be withheld from a FOIA requester unless it need be.1"
The new policy rescinded the Department of Jus-
tice's 1981 FOIA guidelines used for the defense of
agency actions in FOIA litigation.1" Attorney Gen-
eral Reno's FOIA memorandum incorporated Presi-
dent Clinton's FOIA memorandum to establish "a
strong new spirit of openness in government .... -17
Following the Critical Mass II decision and prior
to President Clinton's memorandum, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commis-
'" Critical Mass II, 975 F.2d at 880.
12 Id. at 872. The terms "voluntarily" and "customarily" are
to be given their ordinary dictionary meanings. Id. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
(Unabridged) defines voluntarily as "in a voluntary manner; of
ones own free will." Customarily is defined as "by custom; in
customary manner." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 559, 2564 (1991).
11 Critical Mass II, 975 F.2d at 880.
'4 See White House Memorandum on the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, Oct. 4, 1993. [hereinafter White House Memoran-
dum]. See also, Department of Justice Memorandum on the
Freedom of Information Act, Office of the Attorney General,
Oct. 4, 1993. [hereinafter Attorney General Memorandum].
Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 14.
16 Id. In connection with the repeal of the 1981 guidelines,
the Attorney General requested that the Assistant Attorneys
General for the Department's Civil and Tax Divisions, as well
sion") denied a telecommunications company's FOIA
request. 8 Allnet Communications sought disclosure
of information submitted to the FCC by various tele-
communications companies as part of a cost justifica-
tion for proposed service rates. 9 The FCC, acting in
its regulatory capacity, could have required the in-
formation to be submitted by the companies, but in-
stead accepted it "voluntarily." On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit, in Allnet Communications Services, Inc. v.
FCC,20 held that the confidential commercial infor-
mation exemption of the Freedom of Information
Act applied to information supplied to the FCC by
the telecommunications companies.
2 1
An analysis of the evolution of the law surround-
ing Exemption 4 of the FOIA, particularly the Na-
tional Parks and the Critical Mass decisions, is im-
portant to understanding recent trends on the right
to access information under the FOIA. This analysis,
combined with an examination of the new FOIA
policy guidelines laid out by the Clinton administra-
tion, provides insight into future FOIA litigation
under Exemption 4. Specifically, discussion related
to the Allnet decision and other information supplied
to the FCC will show a distinct judicial trend of un-
dermining the spirit of the FOIA. At issue is the
public's right to gather and communicate informa-
tion and to hold the government accountable within
the principles of democracy.
This Comment will analyze the impact of recent
Exemption 4 decisions on the dissemination of infor-
mation acquired by the FCC. Specifically, Part I
discusses the FOIA's Exemption 4 criteria and ap-
plication of these criteria in litigation. Part II ana-
lyzes how the Critical Mass II decision further ex-
pands the confidentiality prong of the National
Parks test. Part II also sets forth the Clinton admin-
istration's new FOIA policy. Part III examines the
as the United States Attorneys, undertake a review of the merits
of all pending FOIA cases handled by them according to the
standards articulated in the policy memo. Id.
17 Id.
18 In re Allnet Communications Services, Inc., Freedom of
Information Act Request, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7
FCC Rcd. 6329 (1992) [hereinafter Allnet FOIA Order].
'9 Id. The information sought was contained in a report sub-
mitted by Arthur Anderson & Co. to the FCC explaining and
analyzing in detail the Switching Cost Information System and
Switching Cost Model used by the Bell Operating Companies to
apportion joint and common costs between multiple switch func-
tions used to provide unbundled service features. These models
are used to implement Open Network Architecture. Id.
ao Alinet Communications Services, Inc. v. FCC, 800 F.
Supp. 984 (D.D.C. 1992).
21 Id. at 986.
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applicability of the new Exemption 4 category cre-
ated in Critical Mass II in relation to the Allnet case
and an FCC decision regarding Exemption 4. Part
IV analyzes the conflict between the Critical Mass II
standard and the Clinton administration's new
FOIA policy. In conclusion, this Comment considers
the purpose of the FOIA in comparison with the
need for competitive privacy in the communications
industry regarding the new Exemption 4 standard,
and ends with predictions on future Exemption 4
litigation.
I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
EXEMPTION 4
The federal Freedom of Information Act allows
access to the records of all federal agencies, unless
the requested records fall within one of the nine ex-
emptions under which agencies are permitted, but
not required, to withhold the requested informa-
tion.22 Once a FOIA request has been filed, the bur-
den shifts to the government to either release the in-
formation promptly or to show the information is
exempt.23 The FOIA is applicable to every agency,
department, regulatory commission, government con-
trolled corporation, and other establishment in the
Executive Branch of the federal government.24
Exemption 4 provides that the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act does not apply to matters that fall into
either one of two categories. In the first category,
matters involving trade secrets are exempt. In the
second category, information that is commercial or
financial, obtained from a person, and privileged or
22 See supra note 4, and accompanying text.
22 REBECCA DAUGHERTY, FOI SERVICE CENTER, How TO
USE THE FEDERAL FOI ACT (1987).
", Id. "Other establishment" includes: Cabinet offices, such
as the departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Interior (includ-
ing the Bureau of Indian Affairs), Justice (including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Bureau of Prisons); independent regulatory
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, Federal Com-
munications Commission and the Consumer Products Safety
Commission; government controlled corporations, such as the
Postal Service and the Legal Services Corporation; and presiden-
tial commissions. Id. The FOI Act also applies to the Executive
Office of the President and the Office of Management and
Budget, but not to the President or his immediate staff. Id. The
FOI Act also does not apply to state or local governments. Id.
25 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971) (foot-
notes omitted).
2 National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498
F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing S. Rep. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1964)).
confidential, is also exempt. 5
The legislative history is not particularly helpful
when attempting to ascertain the congressional intent
behind the enactment of Exemption 4. The courts,
however, in applying Exemption 4 in litigation, ap-
pear to glean congressional intent from an often cited
Senate Report which states that "this exception is
necessary to protect the confidentiality of information
which is obtained by the Government through ques-
tionnaires or other inquiries, but which would cus-
tomarily not be released to the public by the person
from whom it was obtained. ' '2 6 This broad language
is specific to Exemption 4 and gives an indication of
the purpose behind the exemption.
A. Prong I: Defining Trade Secrets
The D.C. Circuit, in Public Citizen Health Re-
search Group v. FDA,2' adopted a narrow definition
of the term "trade secret." Departing from the broad
definition used in the Restatement of Torts,28 the
court narrowly defined "trade secret" as "a secret,
commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or de-
vice that is used for the making, preparing, com-
pounding, or processing of trade commodities that
can be said to be the end product of either innovation
or substantial effort."29 This definition also required
that a "direct relationship" exist between the trade
secret and the productive process.80 An example of
how narrowly the definition of "trade secret" has
been applied in conjunction with the "direct relation-
ship" test can be seen in AT&T Information Sys-
tems v. GSA. 1 There, parties in a reverse FOIA ac-
27 Public Citizen Health Resource Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Public Citizen brought suit to
compel disclosure of records produced during clinical studies of
safety and efficacy of intraocular lenses. The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the records were not protected as "trade
secrets." Id. at 1287.
28 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757, cmt.(b)(1939), defines
trade secret as: "any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know it or use it."
29 Public Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288.
30 Id. The court held that: "In our opinion, the term 'trade
secrets' in Exemption 4 of the FOIA should be defined in its
narrower common law sense, which incorporates a direct rela-
tionship between the information at issue and the productive
process." Id.
21 AT&T Information Systems v. GSA, 627 F. Supp. 1396
(D.D.C. 1986), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 810 F.2d
1233 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this "reverse FOIA" action, the tele-
communications company filed for declaratory judgment and
preliminary and permanent injunction seeking to prevent GSA
19941
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tion agreed that this narrow definition excluded
pricing information submitted by the plaintiff in a
successful bid for a government contract."2 Narrowly
defining "trade secret" for purposes of exempting in-
formation from disclosure appears to be consistent
with the purpose of the FOIA, given that a narrow
interpretation of trade secret ensures more informa-
tion will fall outside of the scope of that which cate-
gorically would require exemption from disclosure.33
B. Prong II: Commercial or Financial Information
The majority of Exemption 4 cases focus on
whether the information to be withheld falls under
the category of commercial or financial information
that is obtained from a person and that is privileged
or confidential. In order to be exempt from disclos-
ure, the information in question must be either com-
.mercial or financial, and obtained from a person,
and privileged or confidential.'
The courts have consistently held that the terms
commercial and financial should be given their ordi-
nary meaning.35 The D.C. Circuit has rejected the
argument that the term "commercial" be confined to
records that "reveal basic commercial operations,"
holding instead that records are commercial so long
as the submitter has a "commercial interest" in
them.36 Similarly, in Critical Mass Energy Project v.
NRC ("Critical Mass I"), the court held that the
non-profit status of an entity from which the infor-
mation is obtained is a factor to be considered, but
from releasing certain information that GSA had decided to re-
lease in response to a FOIA request. Id.
"2 Id. at 1401 n.9. The court points out that the parties
agree that this narrow definition would exclude the pricing in-
formation that the telecommunications companies seek to prevent
GSA from disclosing. Id. However, the court also points out that
the fact that this information does not constitute a "trade secret"
for purposes of Exemption 4 does not automatically resolve the
issue of release. Id. The court notes that the information in
question may be protected from disclosure if it is commercial or
financial information that is confidential.
aa Id.
3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4) (1988). See also, Gulf & Western
Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(citing National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498
F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
" Allnet Communication Services., Inc. v. FCC, 800 F.
Supp. 984, 988 (D.D.C. 1992).
" Public Citizen Health and Research Group v. FDA, 704
F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Information generally re-
garded as commercial or financial includes: research data, cus-
tomer and supplier lists, profit and loss data, and business sales
statistics. Freedom of Information Act Guide & Privacy Act
Overview, Sept. 1992 at 81 [hereinafter FOIA Guide].
"is not determinative of the character of the informa-
tion." In that case, nuclear industries' trade reports
were held to be "commercial" because the informa-
tion could have affected the profitability of constitu-
ent commercial utility companies.38
The applicability of Exemption 4 to financial in-
formation has been interpreted to include both per-
sonal financial information and economic data gener-
ated by corporations or other business entities.3 9
Standard items generally regarded as financial infor-
mation include: business sales statistics; research
data; technical designs; customer and supplier lists;
profit and loss data; overhead and operating costs;
and information on financial condition.40 Courts
have noted that there is a strong public policy inter-
est in releasing price information relating to aggre-
gate prices in government contract awards.41 Courts
have ordered the disclosure of such information, in
part because "disclosure of prices charged the Gov-
ernment is a cost of doing business with the Govern-
ment. It is unlikely that companies will stop compet-
ing for Government contracts if the prices contracted
for are disclosed." 4
2
The second prong of Exemption 4 encompassing
confidential and financial information also requires
that the information be obtained from a person and
be privileged or confidential. "Person" in this con-
text refers to a broad range of entities including cor-
porations, associations, state governments, agencies of
foreign governments and public or private organiza-
tions. 43 The courts, however, have held that informa-
tion that is generated by the federal government is
37 931 F.2d 939, 942 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991), Critical Mass Energy
Project, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
38 Id. at 943.
" Washington Post Co. v. HHS, 690 F.2d 252, 266 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
40 Landfair v. United States Dep't of the Army, 645 F.
Supp. 325, 327 (D.D.C. 1986). Plaintiff sought disclosure of in-
formation contained in records by defendant pertaining to plans
to correct performance deficiencies of hydraulic turbines installed
at the Chief Joseph Dam in Washington State. Id. at 325.
" See AT&T Information Systems Inc. v. GSA, 627 F.
Supp. 1396, 1403 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 810
F.2d 1333, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
4' Racal-Milgo Gov't Systems, Inc. v. Small Business Ad-
min., 559 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1981) (ordering disclosure of
unit prices charged the government for computer equipment).
See also AT&T Information Systems, 627 F. Supp. 1396 (order-
ing disclosure of AT&T's unit prices for a telecommunications
system because release posed no substantial likelihood of compet-
itive injury).
"' Allnet Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 985,
988 (D.D.C. 1992).
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not "obtained from [sic] [a] person" and is therefore
excluded from Exemption 4.44
With regard to the last criteria under the second
prong, the D.C. Circuit Court has ruled that the
terms "privileged" and "confidential" are not the
same. The court, citing to the legislative history re-
garding "particular privileges," held that "privi-
leged" and "confidential" should not be treated as
synonymous.45
"Confidential" is a key term in Exemption 4 case
law, because most litigation has focused on whether
or not requested information was "confidential."
Prior to 1974, tests for confidentiality focused pri-
marily on whether the government made a confiden-
tial promise to the submitting party,46 or whether
the information was normally the type the submitter
would not release to the public.
47
Prior case law interpretation of "privileged" or
"confidential" information was superseded by the
1974 National Parks Ass'n v. Morton decision.48
That decision established a bright line test by hold-
ing that the test for confidentiality was an "objec-
tive" one.49 The National Parks court adopted a
two-prong test, finding information to be "confiden-
tial" for purposes of Exemption 4 if the disclosure
would: (1) "impair the Government's ability to ob-
tain necessary information in the future;" or (2)
"cause substantial harm to the competitive position
of the person from whom the information was ob-
tained." This was a significant change from prior
interpretations because whether the information
would normally be disclosed to the public by the
4 Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation
Board, 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court here cites
section 551(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which ex-
cludes government agencies from the definition of "persons." Id.
at 582 n.18.
45 Washington Post Co. v. HHS, 690 F.2d 252, 267 n.50
(D.C. Cir. 1982). The court noted that at the time only two
district court cases holding information to be privileged under
Exemption 4 existed; both dealt with the attorney-client privi-
lege, which is explicitly mentioned in the legislative history of
Exemption 4. Id.
48 GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 1969). This
was an action taken by a member of a partnership to compel
GSA to release records for tax purposes regarding property pur-
chased by the partnership from GSA. The court noted that the
government did not contend the appraisal reports to be kept con-
fidential by the appraiser, and thus held that the reports were
not "confidential" within the meaning of the statute. Id.
47 M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471
(D.D.C. 1972). This was an action to compel disclosure of SEC
staff study reports during the course of an investigation. The
court ordered the records released (minus all individual-identify-
ing information), noting that none of the parties could offer any
substantive reason why the reports should not be made available
submitter was no longer considered dispositive in de-
termining Exemption 4 status.51 Similarly, a govern-
ment agency's promise not to release the information
submitted was no longer a factor for Exemption 4
status.
5 2
In addition to adopting the two-prong test, the
court in National Parks reserved decision on the is-
sue of whether other government interests, such as
compliance or program effectiveness, could constitute
a third prong of the exemption. 3
In Critical Mass I," D.C. Circuit Court Judge
Randolph, joined by Judge Williams, suggested that
if this case was one of first impression then the
"'common" meaning of the term "confidential"
would be applied, and the longstanding, widely ac-
cepted National Parks test would be rejected."
While Judges Randolph and Williams conceded that
they were not at liberty to apply their "common
sense" approach due to the fact that the D.C. Circuit
Court had established and applied the National
Parks test on numerous occasions; they contended,
nevertheless, that based on the unambiguous lan-
guage in the statute, there was no reason to apply
the court-made two-pronged "objective" test. 6 The
government's petition for a rehearing en banc was
then granted to consider the theory articulated by
Judges Randolph and Williams.5
7
The Critical Mass proceeding stemmed from a
1984 FOIA request to the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission ("NRC").58 The requestor was interested in
obtaining a series of reports regarding construction
and maintenance problems at nuclear facilities. 9
to the public. Id.
48 National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498
F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'9 Id. at 767 (citing Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d
935, 938, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970)).
80 Id. at 770.
51 Id. at 767.
52 Washington Post Co., v. HHS, 690 F.2d 252, 268 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (citing National Parks, 498 F.2d at 766).
5s National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770 n.17.
"4 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 931 F.2d 939, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph & Williams, JJ., concurring), va-
cated and reh'g en banc granted, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
8" Id. Justice Randolph cites as his "common" meaning of
the word confidential "conveyed [and] acted on . . . in confi-
dence" and "not publicly disseminated." WEBSTER'S THIRD IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 476 (1981).
88 Critical Mass I, 931 F.2d at 948.
87 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 942 F.2d 799
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
58 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE, Vol.
XIII, No. 4, Fall 1992 [hereinafter FOIA UPDATE,
89 Id.
1994]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
The reports were prepared and submitted on a "vol-
untary" basis by the Institute for Nuclear Power
Operations to the NRC. The NRC denied the re-
quest under Exemption 4 and the subsequent litiga-
tion ensued."0 It is important to emphasize that
agencies such as the NRC are charged with oversee-
ing or regulating a particular field or area. Conse-
quently, the NRC, acting pursuant to its regulatory
authority, could have required that the reports pre-
pared by the Institute for Nuclear Power be submit-
ted on a compulsory basis.61
II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE
CRITICAL MASS II DECISION
A. Reaffirmation of National Parks
In its en banc decision in Critical Mass II, the
D.C. Circuit Court reconsidered, but did not over-
turn the two-prong objective test for confidentiality
established in National Parks. Under the principle of
stare decisis, the court reasoned it could not overturn
the long-standing precedent.62 Nevertheless, in a
seven to four decision, the court decided to revisit the
National Parks test in order to "correct some misun-
derstandings as to its scope and application. '" 63
B. New Standard Enunciated in Critical Mass II
In reexamining Critical Mass I, the D.C. Circuit
reviewed the grounds for its decision in that case and
the particular interests protected by Exemption 4.6
The court cited two primary protected interests
noted in the holding of National Parks: "(1) the
Government's need to have access to commercial and
financial data and (2) the need to safeguard persons
submitting such data to the Government from the
competitive harms that might result from general
publication." 6 The court found that there was a
"distinction" in those interests depending upon
00 Id.
e6 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559 (1988).
62 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 875
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
13 Id. at 875.
"' Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 942 F.2d 799
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
65 Critical Mass II, 975 F.2d at 876.
ee Id. at 878.
67 Id. at 879.
,8 Id. at 877-879.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
whether or not the information in question was sub-
mitted to the government on a "voluntary" or com-
pulsory basis.66 Voluntarily submitted information is
now categorically protected provided it is not "cus-
tomarily" disclosed to the public by the submitter.67
Thus, the D.C. Circuit decisively has recognized a
"third prong" under National Parks.
In order to reach this result, the D.C. Circuit
Court was compelled to review the interests of both
the government and the submitters of information
that are protected by Exemption 4." The D.C. Cir-
cuit Court concluded that different interests are im-
plicated depending upon whether the requested in-
formation was submitted voluntarily or under
compulsion." Outlining the government's interest,
the D.C. Circuit Court held that where the submis-
sion of information is "compelled" by the govern-
ment, there is a strong interest in protecting the reli-
ability of the information.7 0 Conversely, where the
information is submitted on a voluntary basis, there
is a strong interest in ensuring the continued availa-
bility of the information.7
1
Sitting en banc, the D.C. Circuit Court reiterated
in Critical Mass II that the submitters' interest in
protecting themselves from competitive injury, lent
itself to analysis under the compelled versus volun-
tary submission analysis.72 Under the compelled sub-
mission test, the possible harm to the submitter is the
"commercial disadvantage" laid out in the "competi-
tive injury" prong of National Parks.73 Under the
voluntary submission test, the interest at stake is
protecting the information that "for whatever reason,
'would customarily not be released to the public by
the person from whom it was obtained.' "7' After es-
tablishing this distinction, the D.C. Circuit Court
noted that "ftihe Supreme Court has encouraged the
development of categorical rules" under FOIA and it
determined that "categorical treatment" is appropri-
ate under Exemption 4.7
Based upon this analysis, the majority in Critical
72 Id.
71 Id. The competitive injury prong is the second of two
prongs articulated in National Parks Conservation Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The two prongs
are referred to disjunctively. A commercial or financial matter is
"confidential" for purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the
information is likely to have either of the following effects: "(1)
to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary informa-
tion in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the com-
petitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained." (Emphasis added). Id. at 770.
7, Critical Mass II, 975 F.2d at 878 (citing Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
75 Id. at 879.
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Mass I decided to reaffirm the National Parks test,
but confined the test "to the category of cases to
which it was first applied.""0 The D.C. Circuit
Court announced a new categorical rule for the pro-
tection of information submitted on a voluntary ba-
sis. Specifically, such information falls within Ex-
emption 4 protection, independent of the National
Parks test, "if it is a kind that the provider would
not customarily release to the public."' 77 In applying
these new standards for Exemption 4 materials, the
D.C. Circuit found that the records in Critical Mass
II came within the protection of Exemption 4.78
Subsequently, it vacated both of its earlier decisions
and affirmed the lower court ruling.7'
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus the
D.C. Court of Appeal's decision reflects the current
status of the law regarding Exemption 4 in the D.C.
Circuit.8" Because most FOIA cases are brought in
this circuit, its decisions are given some deference by
the other circuits. 8' Thus, the Critical Mass II deci-
sion certainly will affect all decisions rendered in
any circuit court involving Exemption 4 of the
FOIA.
C. The Clinton Administration's Guidelines
President Clinton and Attorney General Reno
have issued memoranda to all the federal government
agencies and departments regarding the administra-
tion's policy on the Freedom of Information Act.
Specifically, President Clinton instructed each de-
partment and agency to take steps to ensure compli-
ance with both the letter and the spirit of the
FOIA.8" Calling the FOIA "a vital part of the par-
"6 Id. at 880. The category of cases the court is referring to
are those where a FOIA request is made seeking commercial or
financial information and the information was submitted to the
Government on a compulsory basis. Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
so Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
81 See, e.g., Anderson v. HHS, 907 F.2d 936, 944 (10th Cir.
1990). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expressly
adopted the D.C. Circuit Court's narrow definition of the term
"trade secret," finding it "more consistent with the policies be-
hind the FOIA than the broad restatement definition." Id.
82 White House Memorandum, supra note 14.
83 Id.
64 Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 14.
66 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
88 Allnet Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 984
ticipatory system of government," President Clinton
stated that in addition to responding to information
requests, "each agency and department has a respon-
sibility to distribute information on its own initiative,
and to enhance public access through the use of elec-
tronic information systems." 88
Under the new litigation policy outlined in the
memorandum, Attorney General Reno stated that
"[f]irst and foremost, we must ensure that the princi-
ple of openness in government is applied in each and
every disclosure and nondisclosure decision that is
required under the Act."8 4 The Attorney General
has gone even further by rescinding the Department
of Justice's 1981 guidelines used for the defense of
agency action in FOIA litigation.85 Under the new
policy, a "presumption of disclosure" will be applied
in determining whether or not to defend a nondisclo-
sure decision.86 Attorney General Reno also stated
that "the Department will no longer defend an
agency's withholding of information merely because
there is a 'substantial legal basis' for doing so."87
III. APPLICATION OF THE CRITICAL
MASS H STANDARD TO ALLNET AND FCC
FOIA REQUESTS
A. The Allnet Decision
Allnet Communication Services, Inc., filed a
FOIA request with the FCC seeking disclosure of
certain information submitted to the FCC by several
telecommunications companies as part of a cost justi-
fication for proposed Open Network Architecture
("ONA") service rates.88
(D.D.C. 1992). The computer models and accompanying mater-
ials that were at issue in this case were filed with the FCC to
allow review of the Bell Operating Companies' ("BOCs") tariffs
implementing the ONA program. The Switching Cost Informa-
tion System ("SCIS") is a computer model developed and main-
tained by Bell Communications Research ("Bellcore"). See
Allnet FOIA Order, supra note 18, para. 5. SCIS allows users
to estimate future costs of providing specific types of telecommu-
nications services within a call routing network based on propri-
etary cost and engineering data provided by the switch vendors.
See In re Commission Requirements for Cost Support Material
to be Filed with Open Network Architecture Access Tariffs, Ap-
plication for Review, Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 180, para. 2 (1993).
The SCIS is used in conjunction with the FCC's ONA policies,
which require the BOCs to "unbundle" their basic regulated
telecommunications services. See In re Commission Require-
ments for Cost Support Material to be Filed with Open Net-
work Architecture Access Tariffs, Application for Review,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 422, para. 1
(1993). This procedure is designed to promote efficient use of the
telephone network by providers of unregulated "enhanced ser-
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On September 19, 1992, the FCC's Common Car-
rier Bureau ("Bureau") requested that the BOCs file
computer models and associated data used to develop
the ONA service rates in the first ONA tariffs.
However, the FCC also stated that it would consider
waiving the public filing requirement. The BOCs
petitioned for waiver, arguing that public release of
this information would cause harm to the competi-
tive proprietary interests in their models. The FCC
determined that the information would be exempted
from mandatory disclosure under Exemption 4, but
requested Bellcore to provide access to a redacted
version of the SCIS program and documentation on
a limited basis.8"
Allnet, a participant in the ONA proceeding, re-
ceived access to the redacted version. 0 Unsatisfied,
Allnet filed a FOIA request with the FCC seeking
the information that was submitted to the FCC but
not released to the public.91 On February 7, 1992,
the Bureau denied this request. 2 Allnet requested an
administrative review of this decision.93 When the
agency did not act upon the request in a timely fash-
ion, Allnet filed for an appeal of the FCC decision
on June 9, 1992, in the D.C. District Court.94 Allnet
subsequently modified its request and all parties
moved for summary judgment.95 The court con-
cluded that Allnet's FOIA request was properly de-
nied, thus granting defendant's and defendant inter-
venors' 96 motion for summary judgment.97
B. The Impact of the Allnet Decision
In reaching its decision to deny the FOIA request,
the Allnet court took a hard look at the nature of the
information in question.9" The court stated, "[t]he
critical question in this case is whether the materials
vices" and to prevent BOCs from discriminating against inde-
pendent enhanced service providers. Id. Under the ONA, BOCs
must provide customers with optional unbundled features called
Basic Service Elements ("BSEs"). See 9 FCC Rcd. 180, para. 3.
When BOCs file tariffs containing new services, they must iden-
tify the direct costs of the new service, overhead, and ratio of
unit cost to unit investment and unit price. Because unbundled
BSEs reside within electronic switches that also perform other
functions, rate development requires a specific allocation of joint
and common switching costs and capacity. Id. Thus, the use of
computer models such as SCIS are required.
89 Allnet FOIA Order, supra note 18.
90 Allnet, 800 F. Supp. at 987.
91 Id.
92 Allnet FOIA Order, supra note 18, at 6330.
3 Id.
4 Allnet, 800 F. Supp. at 987. An agency's failure to act on
an administrative FOIA appeal within twenty days, prescribed
sought are confidential or privileged."99 The Court
analyzed the test developed in Critical Mass II,
which stated that "[flinancial or commercial infor-
mation provided to the government on a voluntary
basis is exempt under Exemption 4[sic] if it is of a
kind that the provider would not customarily release
to the public." 100
Based on the language in the Allnet decision, it
appears that the new criteria of voluntary versus
compelled submission of information, although
briefly discussed, was a factor in the court's deci-
sion.' The court took the time to examine the in-
formation in question and then apply the tests de-
pending on whether the information was
"compelled" or provided "voluntarily."'' 02 The court
noted that the government had demonstrated that the
input information provided by the switch vendors for
use in the proposed service rates program was pro-
vided voluntarily, at least in part.'0 3 The FOIA con-
fidential commercial exemption still applies to infor-
mation supplied to the FCC by the various
telecommunications companies, although the test for
voluntary submissions is much easier to satisfy than
the test for required submissions. In Allnet, it was
shown that the information was not customarily re-
leased to the public by the switch vendors.' 0 ' The
switch vendors also indicated a reluctance to supply
proprietary input data necessary for the functioning
of computer models if such information would in fact
be publicly disseminated."0 The Allnet case exem-
plifies how confusing FOIA litigation under Exemp-
tion 4 has become since the Critical Mass II deci-
sion. Further, when viewed in conjunction with the
Clinton administration's new FOIA policy, the Crit-
ical Mass II court has diverged even further from
the purpose of the FOIA.
in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(a)(ii), constitutes a constructive denial
and administrative remedies are deemed exhausted. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(B)) (1988).
"s AlInet, 800 F. Supp. at 987.
" Id. at 985. Defendant intervenors consisted of Bell Com-
munications Research, Inc. and participating Bell Operating
Companies, U.S. West Communications, Inc., American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., and Northern Telecom, Inc. Id.
97 Id. at 990.
99 Id.
19 Id. at 988.
100 Id. (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975
F.2d 871, 879-880 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
101 Id.
12 Id.
1o Id. at 990.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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C. FCC FOIA Requests After Critical Mass II:
What Standard to Apply
U.S. West, Inc., submitted to the Commission an
application to review a Bureau decision regarding
the release of information contained in several leases
involving U.S. West and some of its affiliates.10 6 The
Bureau ruled that "although the leases probably
contained some information that could be competi-
tively damaging, some material in the leases was ei-
ther publicly available or so general as to be of no
competitive utility."'0 7 U.S. West challenged the de-
cision arguing that the leases may be withheld pur-
suant to Exemption 4 of the FOIA.'08 Citing Criti-
cal Mass II, the Commission identified "a pivotal
question" relating to which Exemption 4 is applica-
ble. The Commission focused on the distinction be-
tween "voluntary" and "required" submissions.10 9
U.S. West argued that the leases in question were
voluntarily submitted to the FCC and therefore were
exempt under the Critical Mass II test. 1 The Com-
mission, however, declined to take this issue into ac-
count in deciding that the leases were exempt from
public disclosure. The Commission instead based its
opinion and order solely on the competitive harm test
established in National Parks."' Agreeing with U.S.
West that disclosure of such competitively sensitive
information would cause substantial competitive
harm, the Commission held that the requirements of
Exemption 4 were satisfied.1 2 The order concluded
that the factual issue of voluntary submission need
not be addressed because "U.S. West has met its
burden of establishing that Exemption 4 applies
under the 'competitive harm' test.""' This decision
shows how the test created in Critical Mass II is
confusing and unnecessary, demonstrated here by the
FCC's lack of interest in applying the test and at-
tempting to address the issue of "voluntary" versus
"compelled" submissions.
The need for competitive privacy, particularly in
the communications industry, can be adequately pre-
served by the case law established prior to Critical
Mass II. It is important to point out that if U.S.
West were to appeal the Commission's decision that
IN In re Thomas N. Locke Freedom of Information Act Re-
quest, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 8746
(1993).
107 Id. "Because U.S. West had not identified those specific
portions of the leases that might contain competitively valuable
information, the Bureau denied confidentiality." Id.
108 Id. U.S. West also supplied the additional information
specifying which portions of the leases were competitively sensi-
tive. Id.
109 Id.
the leases in question were exempt from public dis-
closure, the appeal would go before the D.C. Circuit
Court, which decided Critical Mass II.
IV. IS THE EXECUTIVE OR THE JUDI-
CIAL BRANCH CALLING THE SHOTS?
The Clinton administration's new policy appears
to be in direct conflict with the Critical Mass II de-
cision. The Clinton administration favors the volun-
tary dissemination of more information to the pub-
lic."1' The D.C. Circuit Court, however, has taken
extraordinary measures to review a twenty-year-old
policy in order to fashion a more restrictive test on
disclosure of voluntarily submitted information.
Quoting Vice President Gore, President Clinton
called the American people "the federal Govern-
ment's customers." ' Therefore, the American peo-
ple should be entitled to receive more information
with less barriers from agencies and departments. In
fact, the President condemned the existence of "un-
necessary bureaucratic hurdles," as having no place
in the FOIA implementation process. " The D.C.
Circuit Court appears to have gone in the opposite
direction. In its Critical Mass II decision, the court
created a new categorical test to expand Exemption
4 disclosure protection.' 17
It should be noted that the memoranda from the
President and the Attorney General came after the
decision in Critical Mass II, and that owing to sepa-
ration of powers, there is no reason that one policy
has to follow the other. Yet, it remains interesting
that two versions of the FOIA policy should emerge
at roughly the same time and be in such sharp
contrast.
The language in the Attorney General's memo-
randum, however, suggests that the two policies are
not as distinctly juxtaposed as they first appear. Spe-
cifically, the Attorney General's memorandum
speaks of "maximum responsible disclosure of gov-
ernment information while preserving essential con-
fidentiality.""' Arguably, the test established in
Critical Mass II, regarding voluntarily submitted in-
110 Id. para. 4.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 White House Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1.
115 Id.
's Id.
117 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
11 Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 14.
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formation only preserves "essential" confidentiality.
However, when one considers that the test is a fur-
ther delineation of a standard, which, until the Criti-
cal Mass II decision, had served to preserve confi-
dentiality for over twenty years, the Critical Mass II
test seems too contrived. Moreover, when compared
to the new "presumption of disclosure," the test in
Critical Mass II appears even more anomalous. In-
deed, in passing the FOIA, Congress observed the
importance of an informed democracy.119 The execu-
tive branch shares the same concern of an informed
public. 2 The President called the FOIA a "vital
part of the participatory system of government."12'
The Attorney General stated that "the American
public's understanding of the workings of its govern-
ment is a cornerstone of our democracy. "112 Yet, the
judicial branch, particularly the D.C. Circuit, as ex-
emplified in its Critical Mass II decision, does not
share this spirit of openness. While it is not unusual
for the three branches to reach differing opinions, it
is unusual for one branch to be in such direct philo-
sophical conflict with the other two. Although the
Critical Mass II decision is a major reconstruction
and expansion of Exemption 4 and certainly con-
trasts the new administration's FOIA policy memo-
randa, the interpretation in Critical Mass II proba-
bly was suggested by the previous executive branch
that actually litigated the case. Attorney General
Reno's memorandum calls for the rescission of the
Justice Department's 1981 FOIA guidelines. It
should be noted that the 1981 guidelines were the
result of a different administration that controlled
the executive branch for twelve years.
The Critical Mass II court was obliged to further
differentiate the bright line test articulated in Na-
tional Parks, but the purpose of this distinction is
unclear. The court in Allnet, acknowledging that the
plaintiff was no longer seeking the "confidential" in-
put data in dispute, nevertheless held that this infor-
mation is essential to the information that was subse-
quently being sought. 2  The court held,
"[T]herefore, at least some of the information can be
considered 'voluntarily' submitted."'' While this ar-
gument is tenuous at best, the court goes even fur-
119 Critical Mass II, 975 F.2d at 872.
120 White House Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1.
221 Id.
122 Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 14.
12S Allnet Communications Services, Inc. v. FCC, 800 F.
Supp. 872, 990 (D.D.C. 1992).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
ther stating "[t]o the extent that the information
sought was submitted voluntarily, the material was
properly withheld, because, as previously set forth
. . . it has been amply demonstrated that the switch
vendors would not customarily release the informa-
tion to the public."'2 " In the Allnet case, the defend-
ant argues that disclosure of the information sought
would impair the effectiveness of its ONA pro-
gram.' 2 6 The court also held that "Exemption 4[sic]
may be invoked where disclosure of the information
would impair the effectiveness of a government
program.' ' 2
7
The. defendant has shown that the implementation of
ONA is a "significant" FCC priority, and is part of the
Commission's efforts to prevent unreasonable and discrim-
inatory service rates. Without the voluntary, confidential
flow of information between switch vendors and Bellcore,
the ability of the FCC to administer the ONA program
would be impaired. It is doubtful that the FCC would
have the authority to compel the production of the infor-
mation that the switch vendors currently provide
voluntarily.12
The court's conclusion follows from overlapping
grounds. The court speaks in terms of "reluctance"
on the part of the switch vendors in terms of supply-
ing the necessary information to the FCC should
such information not be kept confidential; and it be-
ing "doubtful" that the FCC would have the author-
ity to compel disclosure of such information without
the promise of confidentiality. 29 The language the
court uses is ambiguous, yet apparently sufficient to
deny the plaintiff's request based on the merits. The
court held that the requester's opinion disputing the
risk created by disclosure is not sufficient to preclude
summary judgment for the agency in an action seek-
ing disclosure under the FOIA, if the agency pos-
sessing relevant expertise has provided sufficiently
detailed affidavits.' 0 There is no doubt that the
agency's (and defendant intervenors') affidavits were
sufficiently "detailed" to decide the case on the mo-
tions. The Allnet court, by granting summary judg-
ment on behalf of the defendant and defendant inter-
venors, avoided the opportunity to clarify the
decision regarding which part of the information was
127 Id.
12 Id. (Emphasis added). The SCIS models have been criti-
cal to the review of these rates. Switch vendors have indicated
that if the information they provide were subject to release under
the FOIA, they would be reluctant to supply the proprietary in-
put data that is necessary for the functioning of the computer
models. Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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"voluntarily" submitted and how it was decided
which information was "required." Although the
D.C. Circuit Court applied the proper tests to the
information in question, the court is under no obli-
gation to give more than a brief explanation for its
conclusion. This is indicative of the confusion sur-
rounding Exemption 4 litigation since Critical Mass
II.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in Criti-
cal Mass II. This has permitted the D.C. Circuit to
create a situation where more opportunities exist for
the government, through its agencies and depart-
ments, to withhold information from the public. In
short, the D.C. Circuit has enhanced the ability of
agencies to withhold information, thereby leading to
more confusing litigation under Exemption 4. But, it
was not intended that "in the process of closing loop-
holes in the requirement that the public not be de-
nied legitimate information, that new loopholes be
[sic] created." ' Yet, the court in Critical Mass II
has done just that. A new "loophole" now exists for
more information to be withheld from the public.
While the need for competitive privacy is great, par-
ticularly in the communications industry, that need
must always be balanced against maintaining an in-
"'I M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469
(D.D.C. 1974).
.. Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (citing 112 Cong. Rec. 13,641 (1966) (statement of
formed public.
The question still remains, however, whether or
not the standards in the Critical Mass II decision
will stand. The Clinton administration's new memo-
randum lends substance to the underlying policy that
the FOIA was intended to serve and will, hopefully,
dilute the damage done by the D.C. Circuit in its
Critical Mass II decision. Future FOIA litigation,
particularly Exemption 4, will be even more tedious
and increasingly biased towards the witholding of in-
formation from public disclosure. The Supreme
Court, by declining to grant certiorari, refuses to fol-
low the "spirit of openness" the FOIA demands.
Unless the President introduces his memorandum as
legislation, thereby forcing Congress to take steps to
ensure compliance with the letter and spirit of the
Freedom of Information Act, it is conceivable that
the FOIA will cease to serve a practical purpose.
The courts may continue to fashion new tests for cat-
egorical exemptions, undermining the intention of
the FOIA. The primary purpose of the Freedom of
Information Act is "to increase the citizen's access to
government records."" 2 If action is not taken to pre-
serve this purpose, the tension that is created by the
different approaches articulated above will affect all
agencies and departments; and more importantly, the
public's access to information.
Congressman Moss); 112 Cong. Rec. at 13,653 (statement of
Congressman Rumsfeld); 111 Cong. Rec. 2797 (1965) (state-
ment of Sen. Long)).
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